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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

Pushing a Rope: Balancing the DIME within the Geographic Theaters

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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06 November, 2007

Abstract

Though not *ideally* suited, the geographic combatant commanders are *uniquely* qualified to balance the instruments of national power at the theater level.

An ever-changing global security environment requires a balanced response using all instruments of national power; however, in a post Cold War environment, the United States is ill-prepared to apply the “softer” instruments of power. Balancing policy tools to meet expanding security requirements will demand maximum efficiency from interagency processes. Unfortunately, political realities have prevented meaningful interagency reform at the national-strategic level, a trend which will likely continue. In the short-term, the geographic combatant commanders are best suited to leverage existing federal resources to meet all security goals. However, they must do so with an intent to ultimately pass the responsibilities for shaping and stability to other organizations if the United States’ security apparatus is to truly realize the benefits of “balance” in the long-term.

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Introduction

Changes to the global security landscape in the last two decades demand a new approach to the theater commander's strategies. Today, The United States faces an international environment which fosters enemies who use asymmetric tactics and seek nuclear destruction on American soil. It is widely agreed that facing these challenges requires a *balanced* strategy engaging *all* instruments of national power. However, following the arms race during the Cold War, the instruments of national power are far from balanced, and the resources of the United States' military far exceed those associated with diplomatic, informational and economic tools. Ideally, the instruments of national power could be balanced at the national-strategic level, but the reality of the domestic political environment makes that solution unlikely in the near-term. Instead, it is necessary to empower the military geographic combatant commanders to leverage a balanced response to security requirements within their own theaters.

Thesis

The thesis of this paper is that, though not *ideally* suited, the geographic combatant commanders are *uniquely* qualified to balance the instruments of national power at the theater level.

In addition to an increasing requirement to engage in shaping and stability operations, the United States must also maintain military superiority to dissuade and deter near-peer competitors. Meeting these expanding requirements in a resource constrained environment, will require maximum efficiency from interagency processes. Due to political realities, it is unlikely that the interagency will be sufficiently reformed at the national-strategic level. Therefore, in the short-term geographic combatant commanders are best suited to leverage

existing federal resources to meet all security goals. However, in the long-term they should do so with an intent to ultimately pass the responsibilities for shaping and stability to other governmental agencies.

The Current Security Environment

Terrorism is not a new threat. But, increased access to new technologies and the enormous destructive capacity which can be delivered from the efforts of a few individuals make terrorism a threat to hedge against. The raised stakes demand solutions which address the very source of the threat rather than the symptoms. Since the threat's source is more closely linked to expanding global markets and struggles for cultural legitimacy, than in traditional *realpolitik* balance of power posturing, it is unlikely that purely kinetic military solutions will save the day.

Former Naval War College President vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski describes today's threat as "nuanced".ⁱ Nuanced threats require nuanced solutions. Those solutions are most likely to arrive in the form of soft power, or more likely, soft power balanced with a credible threat of hard power.ⁱⁱ

An evaluation of today's security environment is incomplete without acknowledging the uncertain and shifting nature of tomorrow's challenges. There is danger in focusing too specifically on the fight against radical global insurgents. Policy changes made to address the current global insurgency must be agile enough to respond to a dynamic environment in a relatively short period of time. Creating enduring and adaptive *processes*, therefore, become as important as winning today's battle.

The Inadequacy of U.S. Security Apparatus

Resource Imbalance: Cold War policies of deterrence and containment favored a buildup of the military over the other softer instruments of national power. And while a super-resourced military might have been appropriate for that particular security environment, it is by itself, inadequate for today's needs. Current imbalance makes it challenging to accurately align *action* with *policy*.ⁱⁱⁱ Clarence Bouchat notes that misalignment between the Departments of Defense and State extend well beyond the number of people employed within those departments:

The DoS...has fewer than a brigade's worth of foreign service officers (FSO) (4-5000 people) in the field. Their resources for tangible engagement activities also do not match the opportunities that the DoD's schools, visits, exercises, equipment, and other cooperation activities offer. Thus an imbalance has occurred where the DoS has the authority for international engagement, but the DoD has most of the resources to do so.^{iv}

Stovepiped Inefficiencies: So-called stovepipes undermine unity of effort when they minimize interoperability. Stovepipes are also inefficient as a result of inevitable overlapping capabilities. While both the Department of State and the Department of Defense divide the world into Areas of Responsibility (AOR)—or Regional Bureaus as appropriate in the case of the Department of State—the regions from one department do not match the regions of the other.^v Making matters worse, the informational and economic instruments have no formal organization at the theater level. According to Bouchat, “there are no economic and information regions, equivalent to the DoD AORs and DoS regional bureaus, in which the other elements of national power are planned or coordinated, further weakening national strategic direction at the regional level.”^{vi}

Additionally, the Department of Defense executes regional shaping strategies through its Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), while the Department of State uses the

Mission Performance Plan (MPP) at the state level.^{vii} These two theater plans develop with considerable—albeit informal—input from other departments and agencies, but nonetheless remain unique to the individual department.^{viii} Both plans support the National Security Strategy (NSS), but both serve as stovepiped responses to that guidance and lack combined (interagency) theater level direction to drive a unified regional strategy.

Unity of Command: Both the resource imbalance and stovepiped structure are symptoms of a larger issue—absence of unity of command. The President directs the activities of his cabinet members, but the issue of national security has grown increasingly complex and requires additional oversight. The National Security Council (NSC) exists in an advisory role and has not yet developed the long range planning and coordinating capabilities nor the authority required to fully synchronize interagency processes. Furthermore, the National Security Advisor is appointed by the president, making the NSC’s processes highly dependent on presidential preference and highly susceptible to political allegiance.^{ix}

Unity of command is a means to an end. That end is *unity of effort*. Unity of effort builds efficiencies, and in time balances resources to best meet mission objectives. It is feasible to develop unity of effort through cooperation, but the best chance of success lies in “centralized direction and decentralized execution.”^x

The Ideal Solution

Ideally, the problems of both interagency resource imbalance *and* stovepipes could be solved at the national-strategic-level through clarified unity of command. The same principles of *joint operations* which dissolved stovepipes within the Department of Defense and increased the ability of the uniformed services to work together—while maintaining their unique character and identity—could be applied to the interagency.^{xi} The result would be a

“capabilities-based” approach to national security in which an authoritative *interagency staff* identified *requirements* and assigned *capabilities* to match those requirements to the appropriate organization. Resources would follow and the interagency would *balance* to meet the challenges of the ever-changing security environment. Further efficiencies would emerge as overlapping capabilities diminished and function-sharing increased. In short, *unity of command* for the entire security interagency apparatus would result in improved *unity of effort*. Such unity of effort would place the appropriate capabilities in the theaters and the operational “Security Commanders” could apply their art from a fully sourced and relevant *interagency palette*.

The Reality

Barriers to interagency reform all but eliminate hope for an ideal solution in the near-term. Recent efforts to fundamentally reshape the interagency process have failed to meet expectations. President Clinton’s 1997 efforts to strengthen the NSC in order to streamline interagency processes was “never fully implemented”.^{xii} Similarly, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, designed in 2004 specifically to coordinate the interagency, hasn’t attracted required support. According to Bensahel, “the lack of consistent, high-level interagency representation necessarily limits the office’s ability to truly ‘lead, coordinate, and institutionalize’ US civilian reconstruction efforts.”^{xiii}

A disproportionately resourced military with a limited ability to integrate with other agencies remains the reality. This paper assumes that interagency reform in Washington will not take place in the absence of a major catastrophe.^{xiv}

This paper, therefore, attempts to manage interagency challenges realistically rather than hypothetically.

A Realistic Solution

The instruments of national power *can* be balanced at the theater-strategic level. When developing an achievable solution to the interagency dilemma, it is essential to keep the security objective in mind. The objective is *not* to improve the interagency process for its own sake, but rather to accurately identify security challenges and to appropriately meet those challenges with the correct application of the necessary instruments of national power. Furthermore, this must be done without sacrificing the capability to meet other security priorities. In a resource-constrained environment, improved interagency coordination is an essential element of the stated objective; however, that coordination does not have to take place at the national-strategic-level.

There are *two* basic tenants to this paper's solution: First, elements of both the TSCP and MPP must be blended into a single security document (henceforth referred to as the *Theater Interagency Plan*) which should additionally consider the capabilities of other relevant federal agencies; secondly, the authority to develop and execute that plan—across the interagency—must reside with the geographic combatant commander.

Theater Interagency Plan: A Theater Interagency Plan would combine the Department of Defense's TSCP and the Department of State's MPPs while soliciting additional insights from other relevant federal entities. The plan would leverage "interagency concept" from the ground up, seeking *structured* interagency participation from earliest environmental analysis, through resource evaluation and result in coordinated interagency execution.

Many organizations—both governmental and nongovernmental—work abroad to further human rights, perpetuate democratic practices and strengthen economic capabilities in

developing countries. Most of those efforts strengthen the domestic security of United States by weakening the conditions that contribute to anti-American ideologies. The envisioned endstate for each individual organization might be similar; however, the objectives which drive each organization toward the desired end state are necessarily skewed by organizational perception and biases.

A shared document would achieve improved unity of effort between the various governmental organizations by bridging the gap between theater activities and national level objectives. The plan should represent multiple perspectives, and maintain the capability to incorporate non-governmental-organizations.

Unity of Command—The Geographic Combatant Commander’s Role: As discussed, the unity of effort required to effectively target the complex security environment would benefit from unity of command at some level. Because it is unlikely that necessary changes will take place at the national-strategic level, then it must take place at the theater-strategic level. The geographic combatant commanders should be given sufficient authority to direct the Theater Interagency Plan for their respective areas of responsibility.

While there is little doubt that civilian leadership exhibits the skills and insight to direct the Theater Interagency Plan, the geographic combatant commanders are in the *best* position to do so, primarily as a result of their enhanced ties to national resources.

The combatant commanders have enormous incentive to balance the instruments of national power. If executed effectively, Phase Zero through Phase Two operations (Shaping, Deterring and Seizing the Initiative) could eliminate the requirement to ever engage in a Phase Three (Domination) campaign. ^{xv}

Furthermore, the combatant commanders, using mandated theater estimates, maintain a solid perspective of the unique characteristics that influence their respective theaters.^{xvi} From a security perspective, each part of the world offers unique threats *and* opportunities to the United States. How best to engage those theaters to undermine those threats and capitalize on the opportunities varies. The combatant commanders face those issues daily—in geographic proximity—and therefore provide credible insights to regional policy.

The combatant commanders additionally benefit from a culture which prioritizes joint command culture. Any commander will have held command at multiple levels and participated in numerous joint exercises. Such experience should be considered a unique qualification.

Finally, the combatant commanders hold the *best* tie to the resources required for mission accomplishment. The Joint Operation Planning publication states that Combatant Commanders, “**plan at the national and theater strategic levels of war** through participation in the development of NMS and the development of theater estimates, strategies and plans.” Another responsibility of the CCDR is to “identify required resources” to support theater planning. Combatant Commanders are, by definition, the link between national strategy and theater resources.^{xvii}

Building a Theater Interagency Plan

Understanding the Environment—Interagency Analysis: Properly understanding regional threats and opportunities requires careful analysis. Because current theater estimates take place within the Departments of Defense and State in relative isolation, the analysis is likely skewed by departmental perspectives. A theater estimate developed with formalized interagency input would certainly offer a better balance.

ROSO not ROMO for Interagency Planning: The Range of Military Operations (ROMO) presents mission sets which can be selected to address specific threat situations; in short, it outlines the full spectrum of capability expectations for the military. The options presented by ROMO “vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity”.^{xviii} However, the ROMO is limited in its theater application because it is a military concept for military execution. Though ROMO specifically addresses shaping and cooperation activities it is not built around interagency concepts. The ROMO would be more effective for interagency operations if expanded to encompass the full Range of Security Operations (ROSO). The mission sets would be similar to those found in the ROMO—ranging from *nation assistance* and *foreign humanitarian assistance* on the low intensity end of the scale and escalating to *Major Operations* on the other end (after all the military is part of the interagency and brings unique capabilities of its own)—but the ROSO would *assume* an interagency effort.^{xix}

Therefore, the real value of the ROSO is that it considers non-military capabilities at the genesis of planning. Once a range of operations (or options) is identified, the Theater Interagency Plan Commander must determine which of the operations are critical for success for theater objectives and recognize those operations which warrant risk—a necessary consideration to balance finite resources. The commander must then staff those operations with capabilities. As an interagency commander, he isn’t limited to military capabilities, but can now choose from a host of other federal capabilities as well! ROSO is an essential concept to the Theater Interagency Plan.

Executing a Theater Interagency Plan

Command and Control: Theater interagency command and control presents a unique set of challenges. In a normal command structure the force commander is senior to the local

commander. Within their own states, however, ambassadors serve as the senior representatives to the President.^{xx} The rank issue may be solved by formulating *supported* and *supporting* relationships. For the purposes of the Theater Interagency Plan, the Combatant Commander must be identified as the supported commander. The ambassadors within the region would be placed in a supporting role with the broader Department of State Regional Bureau and all additional relevant federal assets. Though military organizations frequently support other agencies, there is no existing legal imperative for non-military organizations to support military commanders.^{xxi} Outlining this theater command structure should require congressional legislation.

Interestingly a fully integrated interagency relationship developed during the Vietnam conflict despite the absence of legislation. President Johnson appointed his friend Robert Komer to serve as a civilian operations deputy to General Westmoreland. The resulting organization was termed the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). The results were noteworthy:

The interagency integration at all levels was a most impressive feature of CORDS. In addition to the military, the State Department, CIA, AID, the US Information Agency, and even the White House staff were all represented at all levels in its ranks. Throughout the hierarchy, civilian advisors had military deputies and vice versa. Civilians wrote performance reports on military subordinates, and military officers did the same for Foreign Service Officers.^{xxii}

No legislation can provide military commanders with authority over non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Nonetheless, NGOs provide important capabilities which support theater security efforts. Combatant commanders currently utilize Civilian Military Operations Centers (CMOC) to build cooperation. However, many NGO personnel remain wary of military intentions and many choose not to participate. NGO representatives may respond more warmly to civilian federal employees who represent softer forms of

power. If granted the authority to direct federal assets in theater, the combatant commander may also gain improved support from NGOs through federal civilians.

Resource Alignment: One of the more significant benefits of unity of command is improved function sharing. With one leader directing one plan, it becomes possible to prioritize tasks and subsequently prioritize functions to meet those tasks. Much of the framework for crafting a solid interagency plan can be provided by the military: intelligence, airlift, sealift, protection of land and sea lines of communication, communications architecture, and contingency planning are areas where the military excels. But other interagency players including the Treasury Department, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, USAID, Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice and Department of Education bring uniquely important functions as well. A single leader and his staff can synchronize these functions and capabilities to maximize effects.

Perhaps the greatest challenge for the combatant commander is to procure the proper interagency functions and capabilities within his theater. In the current structure, after conducting a complex theater assessment and building plans (mission analysis, Courses of Actions etc...) to meet challenges and shape the theater, the combatant commander submits his assessment and requirements to the Secretary of Defense (via the Service Chiefs who maintain Title 10 oversight) for sourcing.^{xxiii} But if the Combatant Commanders were to submit *integrated* security plans as *Interagency* Commanders to all of the cabinet members it would force interagency coordination at a higher level. This paper does not suggest that all resource requests get approved, or that political processes won't affect ultimate resourcing. However, rather than piecemeal resource requests submitted by various departments,

interagency plans that demonstrate synchronized capabilities to achieve clear theater security objectives certainly hold a better chance of gaining appropriations support.

Counterarguments

Opponents to this paper's proposal might note the irony of any attempt to balance instruments of power by providing more authority to the already dominant power. Furthermore, placing military commanders over civilians reverses the traditional model of U.S. command structure and raises questions as to whether such an arrangement places the military leadership too close to the national policy-making process. In other words, does it create a conflict-of-interest for individuals obligated to *execute* policy rather than make it? Finally, some may feel that the role of an interagency commander might best be handled by a civilian leader. After all, the military has been slow to embrace stability and shaping operations as a core mission. In 2004, a Defense Science Board study determined that the military still did not accept SSTR with the "same seriousness as combat operations."^{xxiv}

Rebuttal

Balancing the instruments through imbalance?: This paper concurs that providing the military instrument significant authority over the State Department and other federal agencies within theater does little to rectify the existing problem surrounding unbalanced resources.

If the larger security objective was simply to resource the various agencies to meet relevant security capabilities this paper's proposal would not make sense. But the objective is to address theater security challenges to support national strategic priorities. There is a time-critical element to this objective. If the United States fails to address the dangers emerging from the ungoverned regions of the world, there is a very real possibility that it will be threatened again on its own soil. Therefore, it is prudent to accept the plan that can

immediately address security threats—even one that is less than ideal in structure. After the threat is mitigated in the near term, it becomes necessary to transition to a sustainable long-term structure. The existing imbalance is one of the reasons that military commanders are best suited for the job; the resource imbalance, though notably part of the problem, is the mechanism that provides the combatant commanders the capabilities to address the problem.

The *long-term focus* must be on building capabilities within the *appropriate* agencies—not just on developing capabilities. During World War II, the State Department, despite President Roosevelt’s insistence, proved unable to lead rebuilding assistance in war ravaged states in Europe and Africa. The responsibility instead fell to the organization with greater resources—the Department of Defense.^{xxv} But once the Department of Defense assumed the responsibility for what, in today’s parlance, is called “Stability, Security Transition and Reconstruction” (SSTR) operations, the Department of State never gained (or seemingly pursued) the resources or structure to adopt the mission.

The combatant commanders must act as a trusted agents for the theater interagency; they will need to advocate resources for the proper agencies, whenever possible, rather than simply adapting military structure to more easily execute the Theater Interagency Plan. Addressing security challenges will remain the primary objective, but building a system that enables other departments and agencies to support security interests through unique and self-sustaining capabilities should remain the enduring goal. That structure is what will ultimately balance theater resources and permit a more responsive security apparatus.

Though on the surface it appears that the military doesn’t have an incentive to surrender power and resources within the theater interagency, it is probable that military leadership would prefer to concentrate on traditional roles of deterrence and dominance.

Not only do those missions support the culture of the military, but the military record in “softer” mission sets in the last two decades has been less than stellar.

Combatant Commanders too close to Policy?: The United States maintains a proud tradition which places the military under civilian control. The argument that reversing that role at the theater-strategic level blurs the lines of policy-making and policy-execution is compelling. However, this paper’s proposal only provides the Military Commander directive authority over the Theater Interagency Plan. That plan is foremost an integrated *security* plan. Theater security issues, though not exclusive to, lie well within the purview of the combatant commander.

The combatant commander will necessarily lobby for resources (as previously discussed) to support his plan, but ultimate sourcing decisions will continue to lie with civilian leadership at the national-strategic level. The combatant commander’s theater assessments will necessarily influence policy decisions, but the role, in this model, continues to be advisory rather than directive.

Why not civilian leadership? The Theater Interagency Plan requires leadership from the best source. In the short term, the best leader brings the most resources. Further down the road, the best leaders will come from the agency that is most closely aligned with the mission, most likely the Department of State.

Another concern suggests that civilians are unwilling to work with military leadership because they do not come from “cultures that embrace doctrinal structure, and (the military) is often perceived as being confining and rigid.”^{xxvi} But this argument fails to hold water. Every job in the federal government requires some degree of oversight and direction. The source of that direction, military or otherwise, is irrelevant.

Many members of the State Department were anxious when Colin Powell—a retired Army General—assumed responsibilities as Secretary of State on January 22, 2001. However, by 2003 Powell was “by all accounts, adored by departmental employees.” More importantly he was enormously effective in achieving unity of effort. “A consortium of 11 organizations of career and politically appointed State employees and foreign policy experts, said Powell had fulfilled his promises to institute ground-level reforms, and summed up his term as ‘historic’”.^{xxvii} Clearly the case of Colin Powell serves as a limited sample, but it does demonstrate the potential interoperability of senior military leaders and government civilians.

Also, despite the combatant commander’s “supported” designation, the bulk of the ground work—and nearly all of the in country leadership—would be executed by the country teams. The combatant commander, in the near term, should provide coordinating leadership and resource advocacy, but as much as possible delegate the bulk of the task force leadership to civilians.

In time, as the multiple organizations (outside the military) that participate in the interagency procure the resourced capabilities *and* develop their cultures to meet shaping and stability standards, the mantle of higher leadership should transition to civilian authorities. However, at this juncture, the combatant commanders are most qualified to coordinate and direct multiple instruments of power within geographic theaters.

Progress

The combatant commanders have already made significant changes to improve interagency processes at the theater level. Marine Corps General Zinni, who commanded the CENTCOM AOR from 1997 to 2000 was the first vocal proponent of leveraging the

interagency to shape his theater.^{xxviii} Today all combatant commanders include interagency *coordination* considerations as part of their strategies.^{xxix} In his 2005 testimony before the Armed Services Committee, Admiral William Fallon, Commander of PACOM AOR, described the importance of interagency coordination through Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) and Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) to his mission.^{xxx}

JIACGs and JIATFs are valuable tools for commanders, but lack authority outside *cooperation*. It's time to formalize those theater relationships. If an operational level security objective demands participation from multiple federal agencies, then the interagency processes that guide that participation must be accomplished with authoritative guidance.

In addition to success with CMOCs, JIACGs and JIATFs, Department of Defense directed Regional Centers for Security Assistance Studies have additionally contributed to interagency development. These centers serve as the “principal strategic communications tools for creating a regional dialogue on U.S. security policy for the Secretary of Defense”.^{xxxi} In 2006, Regional Centers combined the efforts of both civilian and military personnel and reached more than “7000 representatives from over 160 countries.” Also, recent civ/mil humanitarian deployments on the USNS Comfort and the USS Peleliu demonstrate the further successes of theater improvements which have trickled down to the tactical level.^{xxxii}

Two recent national-level documents direct improved interagency coordination. The current Quadrennial Defense review “calls for a formal concept to synchronize civil and military power” and the Defense Directive 3000.05 pushes for enhanced military capabilities in SSTR operations. Furthermore, it notes the importance of civil military relationships to achieve that end.^{xxxiii} It appears that national-level direction actually followed theater reform

in this instance, though it may be a classic “chicken and egg” debate. Nonetheless, interagency reform designed to balance the DIME within the geographic theaters can only encourage interagency improvements at higher levels.

Conclusion

Obstacles to interagency reform at the national strategic level can be effectively bypassed at the theater-strategic level. Initiative and changing expectations have already resulted in significant progress toward improving interagency processes within the geographic theaters. Still, much work remains. In order to meet immediate security requirements, the Departments of State and Defense should coordinate a single security plan for each region with additional interagency support. The geographic combatant commanders should be provided the authority to develop and execute that plan within their AORs.

But the immediate solution introduces an ironic dilemma; the short-term fix to the interagency could ultimately exacerbate the problem. Deliberate care must be taken by the combatant commanders (with oversight from national-strategic leadership) to help *build* interagency capabilities, rather than *incorporate* them into the military machine. The long term objective would see the military return to traditional roles while fellow departments and agencies stepped into their appropriate capabilities. In that manner, security concerns can be addressed by balanced responses which leverage a diverse set of capabilities developed within the unique cultures of multiple federal agencies.

Notes

ⁱ Arthur K. Cerbrowski, “Transformation and the Changing Character of War,” *The Officer* Vol. 80 Iss. 6 (Jul/Aug 2004): 51.

ⁱⁱ The terms “soft” and “hard” are used somewhat loosely here. While diplomatic and economic elements of power may include a coercive element, for the purposes of this paper “hard” will refer strictly to military power.

ⁱⁱⁱ In this paper, “balanced” by no means refers to equal funding or manning across the DIME. Instead, it identifies a condition in which available resources match the threat. It might be fair to say that the instruments of national power were balanced during the Cold War because a large military proved an appropriate response to the Soviet threat. And while it remains necessary to hedge against the threat of a near peer competitor with hard power capabilities, it is also essential to develop the appropriate soft power capabilities to match the current environment.

^{iv} Clarence J. Bouchat, “An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security,” *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* Vol. 29 Iss. 1 (Feb 2007): 100.

^v Mitchell J. Thompson, “Breaking the Proconsulate: A new Design for National Power,” *Parameters* Vol. 35 Iss. 4 (Winter 2005/2006): 62.

^{vi} Bouchat “Introduction to Theater Strategy,” 100.

^{vii} The Mission Performance Plan’s (MPP) name was recently changed to the Mission Strategy Plan (MSP). It is still commonly referred to as the MPP.

^{viii} Gary Taphorn, “Planning for the Security Assistance Organization: Or How do we Get there from Here?” *DISAM Journal of International Security* Vol. 29 Iss. 1 (Feb 07): 89-91. In this section, Taphorn describes the process the Chiefs of Mission use to build their respective MPPs. DoD and the other interagency participants have considerable input to the MPP in what Taphorn terms a “truly interagency activity.” He also describes the development of the TSCP which he implies is built with less interagency input.

^{ix} Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith and Elizabeth McKune, “The National Security Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System Annual Update,” (August 2005): 6-12. This section describes the history, functions and organization of the NSC.

^x Milan Vego, *Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000): 187

^{xi} Christopher L. Naler, “Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command?” *Combined Arms and Joint Operations* (Sep, 2006): 2, http://www.trackpads.com/magazine/publish/article_1711.shtml (accessed Oct. 18, 2007). LTC Naler describes a rough outline for a popular concept in which Goldwater Nichols is extended to include the broader interagency process.

^{xii} Nora Bensahel, “Organising for Nation Building,” *Survival* Vol. 49 Iss. 2 (June, 2007): 47.

^{xiii} Bensahel, “Organising for Nation Building,” 45.

^{xiv} The outlined plan will require support from National Leadership, however. National-level “support” is significantly different than “reform”. “Reform” assumes that the changes will be made to the national security apparatus within the beltway. The incentive to share power without higher direction is lacking in this scenario. However, national-level leadership *does* hold sufficient incentive to facilitate reform within the theaters and could likely be counted on to support a viable plan that furthers that goal.

^{xv} *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 15 September 2006): IV 27.

^{xvi} *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December, 2006): I-9.

^{xvii} Joint Pub 5-0, I-9.

^{xviii} Joint Pub 3-0, I-11.

^{xix} Joint Pub 3.0 p. I-11 This section describes the various capabilities required to support ROMO.

^{xx} Steven E. Cady, *The Country Team: The Critical Interface Between the Department of State and the Department of Defense*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air War College, 1991): 7

^{xxi} Thompson, “Breaking the Proconsulate,” 65.

^{xxii} Thompson, “Breaking the Proconsulate,” 67.

^{xxiii} Bouchat, “Introduction to Theater Strategy,” 104.

^{xxiv} Bensahel, “Organising for Nation Building,” 46.

^{xxv} Kenneth O. McCreedy, “Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany,” *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 65 Iss. 3 (July 2001): 717-718

^{xxvi} Thompson “Breaking the Proconsulate,” 65.

^{xxvii} Shane Harris, “Powell’s Army,” *Government Executive* Vol. 35 Iss. 16 (Nov. 2003): 21.

^{xxviii} Anthony C. Zinni, *Emerging Transnational Threats*, (Berkeley, California: Berkeley Public Policy Press, 2001): 11

^{xxix} Thompson, “Breaking the Proconsulate” 65 This page describes the development of JIACGS in all theaters.

^{xxx} William J. Fallon, speech before The House Armed Services Committee, “U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” (March 7, 2007): 11 http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2007/Fallon_HASCTestimony030707.pdf (accessed Oct. 18, 2007)

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- ^{xxx} No Author Noted, "The Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Assistance Studies," *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* Vol. 29 Iss. 1 (Feb. 2007): 2.
- ^{xxx} Tony Perry, "Naval Forces Humanitarian Role to Expand: Ships, Personnel will Provide More Overseas Aid to Curb Terrorism," *Los Angeles Times* Part A (Oct. 18, 2007): 12
- ^{xxx} Christopher Holshek, "Civil-Military Power and the Future of Civil Affairs," *The Officer* Vol. 83 iss. 4 (May 2007): 45.

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